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Abstract. We consider a class of coalition formation games called he-
donic games, i.e., games in which the utility of a player is completely
determined by the coalition that the player belongs to. We first define
the class of subset-additive hedonic games and show that they have the
same representation power as the class of hedonic games. We then de-
fine a restriction of subset-additive hedonic games that we call subset-
neutral hedonic games and generalize a result by Bogomolnaia and Jack-
son (2002) by showing the existence of a Nash stable partition and an
individually stable partition in such games. We also consider neutrally
anonymous hedonic games and show that they form a subclass of the
subset-additive hedonic games. Finally, we show the existence of a core
stable partition that is also individually stable in neutrally anonymous
hedonic games by exhibiting an algorithm to compute such a partition.
Keywords: hedonic game, coalition formation, stability, cooperative
game
1 Introduction
Coalition formation plays a major role in a broad range of settings. Whether
politicians forming political parties to participate in an election, countries joining
alliances to increase their negotiation power, or students getting together in
groups for a classroom project, one can observe coalition formation at work. It
is therefore important to understand the process of how coalitions form: when
can we expect coalitions to form, and when are the coalition members “happy”
with their coalitions? Within game theory, the importance of coalitions became
clear since von Neumann and Morgenstern’s seminal work Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior was published in 1944.
The hedonic viewpoint of coalition formation was introduced by Dre`ze and
Greenberg (1980), who first called attention to the “hedonic aspect” of the game,
i.e., the determination of a player’s utility by the coalition that the player be-
longs to. Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) introduced
and analyzed stability concepts in hedonic coalition formation games, including
⋆ Supported by a Stanford Graduate Fellowship.
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Nash stability, individual stability, and core stability. Among other things, Bogo-
molnaia and Jackson defined restricted classes of hedonic games called additively
separable hedonic games and symmetric additively separable hedonic games, and
showed that a Nash stable partition always exists in the latter class of games but
not necessarily in the former. Since then, several restrictions on hedonic games
have been proposed, including hedonic games based on best players and hedo-
nic games based on worst players by Cechla´rova´ and Romero-Medina (2001) and
fractional hedonic games by Aziz et al. (2014). Other authors who have proposed
and analyzed restrictions on hedonic games include Alcalde and Revilla (2004),
Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2006), Burani and Zwicker (2003), and Dimitrov
et al. (2006). For an excellent survey on hedonic games, we refer to Hajdukova´
(2006).
In this paper, we define the class of subset-additive hedonic games, which gen-
eralizes the class of additively separable hedonic games. We show that our class
does not provide any restriction on the game – any hedonic game is also a subset-
additive hedonic game. We then define the class of subset-neutral hedonic games,
which is a restriction of subset-additive hedonic games and a generalization of
symmetric additively separable hedonic games. Even though subset-neutral he-
donic games enjoy significantly more representation power than symmetric ad-
ditively separable hedonic games, they also provide a guarantee of the existence
of a Nash stable partition and an individually stable partition. We also consider
neutrally anonymous hedonic games, which is a somewhat restricted class of
games but can still model many interesting situations. We show that they form
a subclass of the subset-neutral hedonic games, hence inheriting the guarantee
of the existence of a Nash stable partition and an individually stable partition.
Finally, we show that a core stable partition that is also individually stable
is guaranteed to exist in neutrally anonymous hedonic games by exhibiting an
algorithm that computes such a partition.
2 Definitions and notation
In this section, we introduce the setting and give definitions and notation that
we will use throughout this paper.
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of n players in the game. Denote by Ni
the set of all subsets of N that include i. A coalition is a nonempty subset of N .
A coalition partition pi is a partition of the set N into disjoint coalitions. Denote
by Cπ(i) the coalition in pi that i belongs to. For any set S, denote by 2
S the
set of all subsets of S and |S| the size of S.
We assume throughout the paper that the players’ preferences are hedonic,
i.e., they are completely determined by the coalition that the player belongs to.
Each player i is endowed with a preference relation i, a reflexive, complete, and
transitive ordering over Ni. Let ≻i denote the strict part and ∼i the indifference
part of the relation i. A hedonic coalition formation game is represented by a
pair (N, {i}ni=1).
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We now define stability notions that we will consider in the paper. The
following three stability notions, which consider deviations by a single player,
were introduced by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
Definition 1. A coalition partition pi is Nash stable if Cπ(i) i C ∪ {i} for all
i ∈ N and C ∈ pi ∪ {∅}.
Definition 2. A coalition partition pi is individually stable if for any i ∈ N and
C ∈ pi ∪ {∅} such that C ∪ {i} ≻i Cπ(i), there exists a player j ∈ C such that
C ≻j Ck ∪ {i}.
Definition 3. A coalition partition pi is contractually individually stable if for
any i ∈ N and C ∈ pi ∪ {∅} such that C ∪ {i} ≻i Cπ(i), there exists either a
player j ∈ C such that C ≻j Ck ∪{i}, or a player k ∈ Cπ(i) such that k 6= i and
Cπ(i) ≻k Cπ(i)\{i}.
Any Nash stable partition is also individually stable and any individually
stable partition is also contractually individually stable. Ballester (2004) showed
that every hedonic game contains at least one contractually individually stable
partition.
Next, we define two stability notions that consider deviations by a coalition.
Definition 4. A coalition C blocks a coalition partition pi if C ≻i Cπ(i) for all
i ∈ C. A coalition partition pi is core stable if any coalition C ⊆ N does not
block pi.
Definition 5. A coalition C weakly blocks a coalition partition pi if C i Cπ(i)
for all i ∈ C and C ≻j Cπ(j) for some j ∈ C. A coalition partition pi is strong
core stable if any coalition C ⊆ N does not weakly block pi.
Any strong core stable partition is also core stable as well as individually
stable, and neither Nash stability nor core stability implies the other.
We now define properties on preference profiles.
Definition 6. A preference profile {i}
n
i=1 is separable if
– C ∪ {j} i C if and only if {i, j} i {i}, and
– C ∪ {j} ≻i C if and only if {i, j} ≻i {i}
for all i, j ∈ N such that i ∈ C and j 6∈ C.
Definition 7. A preference profile {i}ni=1 is additively separable if for all i ∈
N , there exists a function vi : N → R such that
C i D if and only if
∑
j∈C
vi(j) ≥
∑
j∈D
vi(j)
for all C,D ∈ Ni.
Furthermore, an additively separable preference profile is called symmetric if
vi(j) = vj(i) for all i, j ∈ N , and is called mutual if for all i, j ∈ N , vi(j) ≥ 0
whenever vj(i) ≥ 0.
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Definition 8. A preference profile {i}
n
i=1 is anonymous if C ∼i D for any
i ∈ N and any two coalitions C,D such that i ∈ C,D and |C| = |D|.
Definition 9. A preference profile {i}ni=1 satisfies the common ranking prop-
erty if there exists a function w : 2N\{∅} → R such that for all i ∈ N ,
C i D if and only if w(C) ≥ w(D)
for all C,D ∈ Ni.
Definition 10. Given a nonempty set V ⊆ N , a nonempty subset S ⊆ V is a
top coalition of V if for any i ∈ S and any T ⊆ V with i ∈ T , we have S i T . A
preference profile {i}ni=1 satisfies the top-coalition property if for any nonempty
set V ⊆ N , there exists a top coalition of V .
3 Subset-additive and subset-neutral hedonic games
In this section, we define a generalization of additively separable games that we
call subset-additive hedonic games, and show that the class of subset-additive
hedonic games in fact coincides with the class of hedonic games. We then define
a generalization of symmetric additively separable games that we call subset-
neutral hedonic games. We show that subset-neutral hedonic games have more
representation power than symmetric additively separable games, and we gener-
alize a result by Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) by proving that the existence
of a Nash stable partition and an individually stable partition is guaranteed in
subset-neutral hedonic games.
We start with the definition of subset-additive preference profiles.
Definition 11. A preference profile {i}
n
i=1 is subset-additive if for all i ∈ N ,
there exists a function vi : Ni → R such that
C i D if and only if
∑
i∈C′⊆C
vi(C
′) ≥
∑
i∈D′⊆D
vi(D
′).
It turns out that subset-additivity does not provide a restriction on the pref-
erence profile, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 1. Any hedonic game is also a subset-additive hedonic game.
Proof. Consider a preference profile {i}ni=1 of a hedonic game. For all i ∈ N ,
let ui : Ni → R be a utility function consistent with player i’s preference profile.
We define the function vi recursively from smaller to larger sets in Ni. If vi(C
′)
has been defined for all {i} ∈ C′ ( C, we define
vi(C) = ui(C)−
∑
i∈C′(C
vi(C
′).
It follows that
ui(C) ≥ ui(D) if and only if
∑
i∈C′⊆C
vi(C
′) ≥
∑
i∈D′⊆D
vi(D
′),
which implies that the game is subset-additive, as desired.
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Although subset-additivity provides no restriction on the preference profile,
if we impose a neutrality condition on the utility function, we obtain a smaller
class of preference profiles.
Definition 12. A preference profile {i}ni=1 is subset-neutral if there exists a
function w : 2N\{∅} → R such that
C i D if and only if
∑
i∈C′⊆C
w(C′) ≥
∑
i∈D′⊆D
w(D′)
for all i ∈ N .
Subset-neutral preference profiles are useful for modeling situations in which
different teams can form within a coalition. For example, suppose that a po-
lice department is divided into different subdivisions, which correspond to our
coalitions. Certain teams of police officers will be assigned by the chief to tackle
a criminal case based on their combined specialty if they belong to the same
subdivision. The value of a subdivision to a police officer is therefore the sum of
the values of the different teams to which he will be assigned to work on cases.
Since team chemistry varies according to the composition of the team, one can
imagine that the value is different for different teams and cannot be broken down
into values between pairs as in additively separable preference profiles. Subset-
neutral preference profiles also allow for situations in which the chief assigns
as many or as few teams as he likes, since teams that are not assigned simply
correspond to a value of 0.
If we set w(C) = 0 for all |C| > 2 in Definition 12, we obtain the class of
symmetric additively separable preference profiles. Hence any symmetric addi-
tively separable preference profile is also subset-neutral. On the other hand, not
all subset-neutral profiles are additively separable (or even separable), as the
following example shows.
Example 1. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the function w given by
– w({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ;
– w({1, 2}) = w({1, 3}) = w({2, 3}) = 1;
– w({1, 2, 3}) = −10.
We have {1, 3} ≻1 {1} and {1, 2, 3} ≺1 {1, 2}, which violates separability.
A preference profile satisfying subset neutrality cannot have cycles on coali-
tions of size 2 between different players. For instance, it cannot be the case
that {1, 2} ≻1 {1, 3}, {1, 3} ∼3 {2, 3}, and {2, 3} ≻2 {1, 2} hold simultaneously.
On the other hand, cycles on coalitions of size greater than 2 between different
players can occur, as the following example shows.
Example 2. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and the function w given
by
– w({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ;
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– w({1, 2}) = w({1, 2, 3}) = w({1, 2, 4}) = w({1, 4}) = w({2, 3}) = 0;
– w({1, 3}) = w({2, 4}) = 1.
– The value of w on other subsets can be defined arbitrarily.
We have {1, 2, 3} ≻1 {1, 2, 4} and {1, 2, 4} ≻2 {1, 2, 3}.
Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) showed that for symmetric additively sepa-
rable hedonic games, a Nash stable partition and an individually stable partition
exist. The next theorem generalizes that result.
Theorem 1. For subset-neutral hedonic games, a Nash stable partition and an
individually stable partition exist.
Proof. Since a Nash stable partition is also individually stable, it suffices to show
that a Nash stable partition exists.
Consider a partition pi that maximizes the potential function
Φ(pi) =
∑
C∈π
∑
∅6=C′⊆C
w(C′);
such a partition exists since the total number of partitions is finite. We claim
that pi is a Nash stable partition. Suppose for contradiction that player i has an
incentive to move from coalition Cπ(i) to a different coalition Cj . This means
that the utility that i gains from the subsets in Cj is greater than the utility
that i gains from the subsets in Cπ(i), i.e.,
∑
i∈D⊆Cj∪{i}
w(D) >
∑
i∈D⊆Cpi(i)
w(D).
Let pi′ be the partition that is obtained from pi if i moves from coalition Cπ(i)
to Cj . The potential function of the partition pi
′ is
Φ(pi′) = Φ(pi) +
∑
i∈D⊆Cj∪{i}
w(D) −
∑
i∈D⊆Cpi(i)
w(D)
> Φ(pi),
contradicting the assumption that pi is a partition that maximizes the potential
function.
The proof of Theorem 1 relies crucially on neutrality. Bogomolnaia and Jack-
son (2002) showed that an individual stable partition (and hence a Nash stable
partition) may not exist even if preference profiles are additively separable, mu-
tual, and single peaked on a tree. (For the definition of single-peakedness on a
tree, we refer to their paper.) On the other hand, symmetry in additively sep-
arable hedonic games is not enough to guarantee the existence of a core stable
partition. Indeed, Banerjee et al. (2001) showed that a core stable partition (and
hence a strong core stable partition) may not exist even if preference profiles are
additively separable and symmetric.
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4 Neutral anonymity
In this section, we define a restriction of anonymous hedonic games that we
call neutrally anonymous hedonic games. We show that such games are subset-
neutral, and hence existence of a Nash stable partition and an individually stable
partition is guaranteed by results in Section 3. We then show that a partition that
is both core stable and individually stable must exist in neutrally anonymous
hedonic games, and in fact, in the more general class of games whose preference
profiles satisfy the common ranking property. We exhibit an algorithm to find
such a partition.
We start with the definition of neutrally anonymous preference profiles.
Definition 13. A preference profile {i}
n
i=1 is neutrally anonymous if there
exists a function f : {1, 2, . . . , n} → R such that for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
C i D if and only if f(|C|) ≥ f(|D|).
Note that the function f in the definition takes on the cardinality of the set
of players rather than the set of players itself.
Any neutrally anonymous preference profile is also anonymous and satisfies
the common ranking property. On the other hand, a neutrally anonymous pref-
erence profile need not be separable or single-peaked on the size of the coalition
to which the player belongs. Indeed, consider the neutrally anonymous hedonic
game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the function f given by f(1) = 0, f(2) = 1 and
f(3) = −1. This preference profile is neither separable nor single-peaked on the
size of the coalition to which the player belongs.
Even though neutral anonymity is somewhat restrictive, there are interesting
situations that can be modeled using preference profiles satisfying this property.
For instance, a teacher may assign a different amount of work in a classroom
project to groups of students of different sizes. If the students are only concerned
about the amount of work that they have to do, their utility will only depend
on the size of their group. As another example, a restaurant may provide a
different amount of food or issue a different price depending on the size of the
party. If the utility of each customer is determined by the food-to-price ratio, the
situation can again be modeled with a neutrally anonymous hedonic game. One
can imagine that in such situations, the preference profile need not be monotonic
or even single-peaked in the size of the coalition to which the player belongs.
It turns out that any neutrally anonymous hedonic game is also a subset-
neutral hedonic game, as the following proposition shows.
Proposition 2. Any neutrally anonymous preference profile is also subset-neutral.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary neutrally anonymous game, and let f be the func-
tion associated to it as in Definition 13. We will exhibit a function w associated
to it as in Definition 12 such that
f(|C|) =
∑
i∈C′⊆C
w(C′)
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for all i ∈ C ⊆ N .
We define the function w recursively from smaller to larger subsets of N . Be-
cause of neutral anonymity, sets of the same size have the same value of the func-
tion w. Hence it suffices to define the function w for the sets {1}, {1, 2}, . . . , {1, 2, . . . , n}.
If w(C) has been defined for all C ⊆ N such that |C| < k, we define
w({1, 2, . . . , k}) = f(k)−
∑
1∈C({1,2,...,k}
w(C).
It follows that
f(|C|) =
∑
i∈C′⊆C
w(C′)
for all i ∈ C ⊆ N , as desired.
We obtain the following theorem from Theorem 1 and Proposition 2.
Theorem 2. For neutrally anonymous hedonic games, a Nash stable partition
and an individually stable partition exist.
In contrast to Theorem 2, Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002) showed that a
Nash stable partition may not exist even if the preference profile is anonymous
and single-peaked. The next example shows that a Nash stable partition may
not exist even if the preference profile satisfies the common ranking property.
Example 3. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the common ranking
given by
{1, 2} ≻ {1} ≻ {2} ≻ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {3}.
Let pi be any partition of N . If player 3 is left alone in pi, she will have an
incentive to join one of the existing coalitions. Otherwise, player 3 is in the same
coalition in pi as at least one of player 1 and player 2, and that player has an
incentive to form a coalition by herself.
The next theorem shows that a core stable partition that is also individually
stable and contractually individually stable exists in games whose preference
profiles satisfy the common ranking property. On the other hand, a strict core
stable partition may not exist even in neutrally anonymous hedonic games, as
shown by the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the function f given by f(1) = 0,
f(2) = 1 and f(3) = 0.
Theorem 3. For games whose preference profiles satisfy the common ranking
property, a core stable partition that is also individually stable and contractually
individually stable exists. Moreover, we exhibit an algorithm to compute such a
partition.
Proof. Since individual stability implies contractually individual stability, it suf-
fices to give an algorithm to compute a core stable partition that is also individ-
ually stable. The algorithm operates as follows:
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1. Initially, let S be the set of all players.
2. Repeat the following until S = ∅:
– Choose a coalition T ⊆ S that ranks highest in the common ranking of
all the nonempty subsets of S. If there are several such coalitions, choose
one with the largest size.
– Remove the players in T from S.
The algorithm clearly terminates. We first show that the resulting partition
is core stable. We prove by induction that when a coalition is formed by the
algorithm, every player in the coalition is unwilling to participate in a block-
ing coalition. This is true for the first coalition formed, since the players in the
coalition rank the coalition highest in their ranking. For any subsequent coalition
formed, a player in the coalition rank the coalition highest among the coalitions
that she can form using her coalition and the remaining players. By the induc-
tion hypothesis, no player in previous coalitions is willing to participate in a
blocking coalition. Hence the players in the coalition formed also do not want to
participate in a blocking coalition, completing the induction.
We now show that the resulting partition is individually stable. Consider a
deviation by player i. Again, she is already in a coalition that ranks highest
among the coalitions that she can form using her coalition and the remaining
players. Hence she has no incentive to switch to a coalition formed after her.
If she switches to a coalition formed before her, then since that coalition is a
largest coalition that ranks highest when it is formed, the inclusion of player i
necessarily leaves the members of that coalition worse off. Finally, player i has
no incentive to form a coalition on her own if she is not already in a coalition
by herself. Hence the partition is individually stable, as desired.
The algorithm in Theorem 3 is a specific version of the algorithm proposed
by Banerjee et al. (2001) for finding a core stable partition when the preference
satisfies the top-coalition property. While our algorithm requires a stronger con-
dition, it produces a partition that is both core stable and individually stable,
instead of only core stable. The crucial difference between the two algorithms
is that our algorithm requires in Step 2 that if there are several coalitions that
rank highest among the remaining coalitions, our algorithm chooses a coalition
with the largest size. If we eliminate this requirement, the resulting partition is
no longer guaranteed to be individually stable, as the following example shows.
Example 4. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the common ranking
given by
{1, 2} ∼ {1, 2, 3} ≻ {2} ≻ {1} ≻ {1, 3} ≻ {2, 3} ≻ {3}.
Initially, {1, 2} and {1, 2, 3} are the coalitions that rank highest in the com-
mon ranking. If the algorithm chooses the coalition {1, 2} as the first coalition,
the resulting partition will be {1, 2}, {3}. This partition is not individually sta-
ble, however, since player 3 can benefit by joining the other two players while
not leaving them worse off.
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In addition, if we assume only the top-coalition property, then Banerjee et
al.’s algorithm (or any specific version of it) is not guaranteed to return an
individually stable partition, as the following example shows.
Example 5. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the preference profile
1,2,3 given by
– {1, 2} ∼1 {1, 2, 3} ≻1 {1} ≻1 {1, 3};
– {1, 2} ∼2 {1, 2, 3} ≻2 {2} ≻2 {2, 3};
– {1, 3} ∼3 {2, 3} ≻3 {1, 2, 3} ≻3 {3}.
The preference profile  satisfies the top-coalition property. Indeed, {i} is a
top coalition of {i} for all i ∈ N , {1, 2} is a top coalition of {1, 2} and {1, 2, 3},
{1} is a top coalition of {1, 3}, and {2} is a top coalition of {2, 3}.
Since {1, 2} is the unique top coalition in {1, 2, 3}, Banerjee et al.’s algorithm
(or any specific version of it) will choose {1, 2} in the first step, yielding the
partition {1, 2}, {3}. This partition is not individually stable, however, since
player 3 can benefit by joining the other two players while not leaving them
worse off.
We obtain the following as a corollary of Theorem 3.
Corollary 1. For neutrally anonymous hedonic games, a core stable partition
that is also individually stable and contractually individually stable exists.
In contrast to Theorem 3, Banerjee et al. (2001) showed that a core stable par-
tition may not exist even if the preference profile is anonymous, singled-peaked
on population, and satisfies the population’s intermediate preference property.
(For definitions, we refer to their paper.)
Although a core stable partition produced by the algorithm in Theorem 3 is
guaranteed to be individually stable, this is not necessarily the case for any core
stable partition in neutrally anonymous hedonic games. In fact, a core stable
partition need not even be contractually individually stable in such games, as
the following example shows.
Example 6. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3} and the function f given by
f(1) = 0 and f(2) = f(3) = 1.
The partition {1, 2}, {3} is core stable but not contractually individually
stable, since player 3 can join the coalition {1, 2} without leaving any member of
her old or new coalition worse off. In this example, the grand coalition {1, 2, 3}
is both core stable and individually stable.
Theorems 2 and 3 guarantee the existence of both a Nash stable partition
and a core stable partition in neutrally anonymous hedonic games. Nevertheless,
there may not exist a partition that is both Nash stable and core stable, as the
following example shows.
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Example 7. Consider the game with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and the function f given
by f(1) = 0, f(2) = 2, f(3) = 1, and f(4) = f(5) = 0.
Any core stable partition cannot contain a coalition of size 3, 4, or 5, since
two players from such a coalition form a blocking coalition. A partition that
consists only of coalitions of size 1 and 2, however, necessarily contains a player
in a coalition by herself. Such a player has an incentive to switch to any existing
coalition, which implies that such a partition cannot be Nash stable.
Example 7 also shows that neither Nash stability nor core stability implies
the other even in neutrally anonymous hedonic games.
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